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Methodology
LATCRIT INTRODUCTION: METHODS
REGINALD OH*

I

N introducing the following cluster essays, I find it appropriate to para
phrase the political slogan made famous by the 1992 Bill Clinton presi
dential campaign: "It's the method, stupid." 1 Both authors emphasize the
centrality of method in any critical project seeking to transform present
inegalitarian social structures. The goal of liberating society of its hierar
chies, subordinations and oppressions can only succeed if critical scholars
have the appropriate methods of inquiry. Specifically, if we have methods
of inquiry that help us to rethink and reconceptualize seemingly intracta
ble social problems, we then can create and develop novel and innovative
solutions to effectively confront such problems. The authors in the follow
ing cluster pieces argue forcefully and convincingly that LatCrit scholars
need to pay serious attention to developing critical legal methods to
achieve this transformation of society.
First, Professor Mary Romero's essay is a call to LatCrit scholars to
take method seriously. 2 She critiques what she believes is the propensity
among critical scholars to engage in analyses that are "overly psychologi
cal" and that fail to "illuminate circumstances or issues, but rather distort
material realities and legal structures that exist." 3 Professor Romero char
acterizes the focus on psychological answers to problems of subordination
as one of "psychological reductionism." 4 Under this approach, racism is
reduced to a phenomenon created by the individual state of mind. Thus,
scholars employing that method focus on concepts such as unconscious
racism, and interrogate how human cognitive processes "reveal and illumi
nate unconscious racism" in white people. 5 Moreover, such scholars tell

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A.,
Oberlin College; J.D., Boston College Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University
Law Center.
1. See Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: Political Memo; Clinton's 4-Point Plan to
Win the First Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at A21 (discussing then-candidate Bill
Clinton's campaign strategy for 1992 presidential election, which was centered
around slogan "It's the economy, stupid.").
2. Mary Romero, Revisiting Outcrits with a Sociological Imagination, 50 VILL. L.
REv. 925 (2005).
3. Id. at 925 (criticizing overly psychological analysis of LatCrit).
4. Id. (arguing "[i)ndividual focus and psychological explanations to racism
contradict proposals for structural change and undermines the significance of col
lective action in the struggle against inequality").
5. Id. at 933 (identifying shift in critical race theory from institutional to
psychological).
(905)
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narratives describing the personal biographies of socially marginalized
persons, giving personal accounts in rich detail without linking their strug
gles to the larger structural forces creating the conditions for their
struggles.
For Romero, the psychological method is problematic because it fo
cuses our critical attention solely on issues of individual motivation, per
sonal identity and personal empowerment and self-esteem, and diverts our
attention away from the larger structural, political, economic and cultural
circumstances that cause and contribute to subordination. 6 Her answer to
the pitfalls of psychological analysis is the "sociological imagination."
Drawing on the theories of sociologist C. Wright Mills, Professor Romero
urges critical scholars to adopt a sociological imagination, a method that
seeks to locate personal stories of social struggle within the larger struc
tural transformations taking place in society. 7 A sociological imagination
would help scholars link "biography to history," and aid them in "identify
ing the causes of subordination and developing anti-subordination
praxes." 8
A sociological imagination would also divert our focus away from the
narrow issue of unconscious racism and onto the broader issue of institu
tional racism. The move from analyzing unconscious racism to analyzing
institutional racism, argues Romero, "brings us back to the central issues
of power and privilege." 9 A focus on institutional racism gets away from
the useless attempt to change "the hearts and minds of white folks," and
puts our emphasis back on "the consequences of bureaucratic and other
everyday practices that transcend hateful attitudes and individual racist
acts. Institutional racism gets us out of the psychological swamp of white
guilt and lets us focus on the irrationalities built into supposedly rational
institutions." 10
Professor lmani Perry boldly asserts that "[£1 or scholars, method is
paramount. How one asks the question and pursues the answer are per
haps the two greatest choices to be made . . . ." 11 She then argues that
LatCrit theorists should incorporate cultural analysis into their critiques of
race and the law.12

6. See id. (indicating that racism is "so underground and subtle" that it be
comes unconscious).
7. See id. at 926-28 (arguing sociological imagination is more consistent with
LatCrit's commitment to inclusiveness).
8. Id. at 931.
9. Id. at 936 (identifying concept of institutional racism).
10. Id. at 937 (citing Mary Romero, Brown is Beautiful, 39 LAw & Soc'v REv.
211 (2005)).
11. lmani Perry, Cultural Studies, LatCrit, and Methodologi,cal Harmony, 50 VILL.
L. REv. 915, 915 (2005).
12. Id.
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For Professor Perry, the cultural method is one in which the "world is
read as a series of texts." 18 She contends that all aspects of cultural pro
duction and practices can be viewed as text, and that critical scholars
ought to "read" social practices as texts and relate them to structural as
pects of law and racism to show how culture and structure reinforce one
another. Specifically, Professor Perry argues that reading social practices
as text is a useful method for understanding how values and messages are
transmitted and reproduced through various social practices, and how
those transmitted values and messages then shape and influence the ideo
logical underpinnings of law, which in turn shape and influence social
practices. 14
In her essay, Professor Perry provides a brief but illuminating exam
ple of her cultural method at work. She analyzes ("reads") one particular
cultural text, the television talk show topic of "paternity tests." On these
shows, young women of color go on national television, reveal to the audi
ence that they are not sure who the father of their children are and then
proceed to invite men on the show and subject them to paternity tests to
try to identify the real father of the child. Professor Perry notes that each
individual "paternity test" show is "no more than a personal saga, interest
ing, heartbreaking, compelling." 15 Upon repeated viewings of countless
talk shows that repeat the same theme with different women of color, she
contends that these shows are evidence of a larger cultural narrative that
rationalizes the plight of impoverished single mothers. This narrative jus
tifies the subordination of poor, single mothers who "deserve" their plight
because their problem has been caused by their own "licentious and pro
miscuous" behaviors-by having sexual relations with so many different
men that they cannot even be sure who is the real father of their child. 16
Thus, based on her cultural analysis of "paternity test" talk shows, she con
cludes that "it is in the systematic observation, in the cultural fabric, that
we see how the shows affirm and recodify stereotypes already existing in
American culture." 1 7
Utilizing Professor Perry's cultural analysis can help to uncover and
reveal social patterns, values and beliefs embedded within seemingly, mi
nor, discrete, individualized, personal and isolated acts of individuals. In
keeping with Professor Romero's call to LatCrit scholars to link the per
sonal to the political, Professor Perry's cultural analysis links the personal
issue of sexual relations to the larger political-economic issue of the subor
13. Id. at 916 (noting cultural production is text read in relation to other
texts).
14. See id. at 915 (identifying LatCrit as scholarly movement that emerged
from political movement, which is designed to encourage individuals to critique
ideological underpinnings of injustice and marginalization).
15. Id. at 916 (describing how subjects on television talk shows create dis
course about sexuality of young women of color and arguing such shows reinforce
racial stereotypes).
16. See id. at 917.
17. Id. at 918.
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dination of poor, single mothers of color. Both essays require attention, as
they emphasize the importance of thinking critically about how we engage
in our critical analysis. To put it another way, the essays call on us to think
critically about our critical thinking.
I want to conclude this introduction by re-examining the issue raised
by Professor Romero regarding the need to move away from analyzing
unconscious racism and instead towards analyzing institutional racism. 18
While I agree generally with her call to locate personal struggles within the
larger structural context, I believe, consistent with her call for critical
scholars to adopt a sociological imagination, that there is a way to link
unconscious racism with institutional racism. I do not view the phenome
non of unconscious racism as something separate and distinct from that of
institutional racism. Instead, I view unconscious racism as an integral aspect
of the institutional structures that reinforce and perpetuate racial subordi
nation. To explain this connection, I will briefly discuss the issues of un
conscious racism and institutional racism in the context of employment
discrimination law.
Professor Michael Selmi wrote a recent essay entitled Why Are Employ
ment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win ?19 He notes statistics showing that
only about fifteen percent of claims filed with the Equal Employment Op
portunity Commission (EEOC) result in some sort of relief being provided
to plaintiffs. 20 A substantial number of employment discrimination claims
filed in federal court are dismissed at the pretrial litigation stage, and of
those cases dismissed by pretrial motion, ninety-eight percent are won by
defendants. 21 Those cases that do make it to trial suffer lower success
rates when compared to other civil cases. 22 Although in his essay he exam
ines the difficulties inherent in bringing any employment discrimination
claim, whether based on race, sex, age or disability, he emphasizes that
race discrimination claims are the most difficult cases to win. 23
The question arises: why are claims of employment discrimination on
the basis of race so difficult to win? In larger measure, the reason is be
cause the courts are simply hostile to race discrimination claims and ap
parently believe that claims of racial discrimination are presumptively
18. See Romero, supra note 2, at 933-37 (discussing pitfalls of using psychologi
cal foundation).
19. See generally Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard
To Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555 (2001) (examining trend in federal courts to find for
employers in majority of employment discrimination cases).
20. See id. at 558 (comparing success rate of employment discrimination plain
tiffs to that of other civil plaintiffs).
21. See id. at 560 (collecting statistics for employment discrimination, insur
ance and personal injury claims and success rate of plaintiff at various stages of
litigation).
22. See id. at 560-61.
23. See id. at 562 (discussing reasons why race discrimination claims are more
difficult to win than other types of employment discrimination claims).
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frivolous. 24 When it comes to race cases, "courts often seem mired in a
belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, brought by whining
plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the
way."25
Are courts and employers right? Are plaintiffs unsuccessful because
they raise unsubstantiated, frivolous claims of racial bias? The answer is
no, and I argue the reason why courts and employers fail to see racism in
the workplace, and instead blame victims for essentially playing the race
card, is because they use an outmoded conception of discrimination to
analyze employment discrimination claims. To use Professor Romero's
terminology, they fail to see the unconscious and institutional biases at
work in the employment context because they are operating under the
premises of "psychological reductionism," and thinking of racism solely in
terms of intentional psychological motivation. 26
Thus, in deciding Title VII claims, the courts miss and obscure the
racism taking place in the workplace because judges continue to use a
formalistic, psychologically simplistic and unrealistic model of intentional
discrimination that fails to address the subtle or unconscious racism oper
ating in the workplace. Under the psychologically reductionist view of ra
cism, the assumption is that there are certain people in society who are
racists by nature and who, if they had the chance, would invidiously dis
criminate against people of color and would deliberately exclude them
from the workforce.
The reductionist view, therefore, assumes that racism is a character
trait, and the people who possess this trait then are categorized as "racists."
Like an aspect of personality, an actor's racist characteristic is believed to
be stable and to express itself consistently over time and in different situa
tions.27 Under this model of racism, racist decision-makers are conscious
of their racism, and if permitted, would openly discriminate against per
sons of color based on their race. However, given that Title VII employ
ment discrimination law prohibits explicit racial discrimination, the racist
decision-makers, if they want to act on their racist impulses, must engage
in covert racism to avoid legal liability. In other words, racist employers,
when they act upon their racism, in order to avoid Title VII liability, must
hide their true racist motives under a facially neutral rationale.
24. See id. at 556 (outlining reasons for plaintiffs' difficulties in employment
discrimination claims in general, and in those based on race specifically).
25. Id.
26. See Romero, supra note 2, at 925 ("Individual focus and psychological ex
planations to racism contradicts proposals for structural change and undermines
the significance of collective action in the struggle against inequality.").
27. See Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Seif-Fulfilling Stereotypes,
53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1013, 1022-23 (2004) (noting many people tend to ignore influ
ence of particular situations on actor's response in racially-charged situations, and
instead focus on actor's character).
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Thus, relying on this conventional model of racism, Title VII legal
doctrine has been constructed in order to uncover the "true" racist mo
tives of an employer. Under the disparate treatment test from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 28 when an employee seeks to prove that his/her
employer racially discriminated against him/her using indirect or circum
stantial evidence, the plaintiffs claim is determined through a three part
analytical framework. 29 First, the employee must make out a prima facie
case of racial discrimination or disparate treatment. Once the employee
makes out a prima facie case, then an inference of racial discrimination
will arise. 30 Second, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the
employer then has the burden of production to produce evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment deci
sion. 31 Third, the employee has the burden of proving that the legitimate
reason proffered by the employer is merely "pretext," a false reason given
to hide the real or true racist motive for the adverse employment deci
sion. 32 Under Title VII disparate treatment doctrine, a plaintiffs prima
facie showing of racially differential treatment can be overcome by an em
ployer who proffers a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the adverse em
ployment decision. 33 Therefore, under the doctrine, the presence of a
legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision is proof that racial
discrimination did not occur.
What is the problem with the conventional model of racial discrimina
tion and the disparate treatment test that is based on that model? The
conventional model of racism just does not seem to square with or explain
the acts of racism occurring in the workplace. Deliberate, self-consciously
aware racists are not the norm in today's workplace. There is widespread
public and social consensus that racial discrimination and bigotry is
wrong, and most people desire to maintain an "egalitarian, nonracist self
image."
The problem today is not the existence of deliberate racists in the Jim
Crow segregationist mold. Instead, the problems in today's workplace are
unconscious racial bias and subtle racism, which actually operate outside
of the conscious awareness of the "racist" actor. 34 In today's post-civil
28. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (establishing test by which all Title VII em
ployment discrimination claims based on theory of disparate treatment are
analyzed).
29. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hopkins, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (clarify
ing burdens of parties in employment discrimination claims).
30. See id. at 506 (discussing first step of burden-shifting stmcture applied to
Title VII cases).
31. See id. at 506-07 (discussing second step of burden-shifting stmcture ap
plied to Title VII cases).
32. See id. at 507-08 (discussing final step of burden-shifting stmcture applied
to Title VII cases).
33. See id. at 507.
34. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cogni
tive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
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rights world, racism operates not through deliberate acts of racial discrimi
nation, but through seemingly facially race-neutral acts. 35 Thus, because
courts and employers fail to recognize and understand how racism really
operates today, they dismiss allegations of unconscious or subtle racism as
merit-less and frivolous.
Social psychologists contend that today, much racism takes the form
of what they call aversive racism. Aversive racism "represents a subtle,
often unintentional, form of bias that characterizes many white Americans
who possess strong egalitarian values and who believe that they are non
prejudiced."36 People who engage in aversive racism do not wish to dis
criminate against people of color; rather, they honestly and consciously
believe and affirm notions of racial equality, and often act positively upon
their egalitarian beliefs. 37
Many studies have been conducted to show aversive racism at work. A
number of experimental studies have focused on examining the helping
behavior of people. In these studies, researchers create scenarios to see
how people respond to others in need of help and whether or not their
helping responses are affected by the race of the victims. Studies on help
ing behavior have found that white people would discriminate against
black victims and refuse to help them when it appeared that the black
victims created their own problems. 38 On the other hand, the studies
showed that white people treated and helped black victims favorably or
even more favorably than white victims when it was perceived that the
black victims' plight was caused by factors outside of their control. 39
What implications may we draw from these studies? One critical find
ing is that the studies show that aversive racism is a situational phenome
non. In other words, contrary to the conventional model of racism, a
person does not possess and act upon racist impulses consistently in differ
ent places and times. Rather, studies show that certain situations and con
texts trigger aversively racist behavior in white people, while certain
situations and contexts actually promote race-neutral, egalitarian behavior
RE.v. 1161 (1995) (analyzing workplace situations and current Title VII trends and
cultures); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. RE.v. 317 (1987) (discussing role of discrimina
tory motive in equal protection claims).
35. See Wang, supra note 27, at 1045 (describing situations that seem racially
neutral, but can be affected by subconsciously-held racial stereotypes).
36. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE.v. 91, 97 (2003)
(quoting John J. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary
Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and ChaUenges ofAversive Racism, in CONFRONTING
RAc1sM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske
eds., 1998)).
37. See id. (explaining that aversive racism is not conscious, but rather results
from unconscious negative feelings).
38. See Wang, supra note 27, at 1039 (describing results of studies conducted
to research behavior of people in racially-neutral situations).
39. See id.
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in white people. In other words, whether a person acts in a racially biased
manner depends, not so much on his/her personality, ideology or beliefs,
but on the nature and circumstances of the situation.
Specifically, social psychologists suggest that unconscious racial biases
are triggered in situations that are normatively ambiguous. 40 A norma
tively ambiguous situation is one in which morally appropriate behavior
has not been clearly identified. 41 In such a context, negative behavior
against a person of color can be justified on some other basis besides race
and thus provides a legitimate, nonracial reason for the negative behavior
towards a person of color. Thus, under certain situations, even such per
sons with conscious egalitarian beliefs may unknowingly act on uncon
scious stereotypes and negative beliefs.
Numerous social psychology studies have demonstrated the power of
the normatively ambiguous situation to induce persons to act upon uncon
scious biases. In one helping study, whites would help black victims in
situations of normative clarity when it was clear that in order to avoid the
perception of racism they needed to help the black victim. 42 In these nor
matively clear situations, whites are not likely to act upon their uncon
scious biases, and instead, they may act in ways more favorable and helpful
to persons of color. 43 On the other hand, whites would not help black
victims when the situation was normatively ambiguous-when they could
refuse to help the black victim, and in doing so still maintain their egalita
rian self-image by attributing their decision not to help another, nonracial,
neutral reason.
Second, the situational nature of aversive racism has enormous impli
cations for Title VII specifically, and for anti-discrimination law in general.
As discussed earlier, under Title VII disparate treatment doctrine, a plain
tiffs prima facie showing of racially differential treatment can be over
come by an employer who proffers a legitimate, race-neutral reason for
the adverse employment decision. Under the doctrine, the presence of a
legitimate reason for the adverse decision-making is proof that racial dis
crimination did not occur; and thus, an employer can escape liability by
putting forth a legitimate reason for a decision adversely affecting a racial
minority.
The social psychology findings, however, strongly suggest that the dis
parate treatment doctrine has it completely backwards. The McDonnell
Douglas disparate treatment test is based on the conventional model of
racism. Under the conventional view of racial discrimination, the racist
40. See id. at 1036 ("[S]ocial psychologists who study contemporary discrimi
nation have discovered, much as Milgram did, the power of ambiguity or the lack of
definitional clarity in a situation to open a channel to behavior that otherwise
would seem clearly wrong.").
41. See id. at 1035-36 (discussing normatively ambiguous racial situations).
42. See id. at 1037 (describing results of social psychology experiments involv
ing situations when it was clear what moral, egalitarian people should do).
43. See id. at 1037.
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employer first decides to act on his/her racial bias, and then comes up
with a nonracial, pretextual reason to "cover up" the true, racist reason for
firing a person of color. The racist motive precedes the pretextual reason.
According to the research on aversive racism, however, the causal re
lationship between the racist reason and the pretextual reason is reversed.
When aversive racism is in operation, the presence or existence of a legiti
mate, nonracial reason for an adverse employment decision exists prior to
the racially biased action. The legitimate reason triggers or "causes" an
otherwise egalitarian decision-maker to be influenced by his/her uncon
scious racial biases.
Counter-intuitively, then, the situational research hypothesis suggests
that the presence of a legitimate reason for an adverse employment deci
sion makes it even more likely, not less likely, that racial bias was a factor in a
negative decision against a person of color. The helping studies discussed
above actually suggest that racially biased treatment and legitimate, non
discriminatory justifications are likely to coexist with allegations of racism
because the presence of a legitimate reason may have produced a norma
tively ambiguous situation which then triggered unconscious biases in the
decision-maker.
Thus, Title VII might actually be encouraging employers to construct
workplace situations that promote rather than deter racially biased deci
sion-making. If employers can avoid Title VII liability by proffering a legit
imate reason for an adverse employment decision, they are likely to
continue to structure decision-making in such a way that employers can
always assert a legitimate reason to justify an adverse decision. To the ex
tent that such situations actually encourage racially biased decision-mak
ing, Title VII doctrine is actually giving employers an incentive to
construct racially biased workplace situations that produce biased deci
sion-making. The law itself, in other words, may be playing a significant
role in producing the sort of behavior it is purportedly seeking to
eliminate. 44
In addition to having implications for rethi~king Title VII doctrine,
the aversive racism studies have implications for the general discussion of
critical method concerning the analysis of racism and the law. First, aver
sive racism and social psychology research in general may provide the link
in connecting unconscious racism with institutional racism. To confront
unconscious racism, social psychology informs us that it is not useful to try
to "change the hearts and minds of white folk." Rather, the key is to focus
44. A recent Supreme Court decision on Title VII may have significantly al
tered the Court's disparate treatment doctrine. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding direct evidence is not required to trigger the Price
Waterhouse mixed motive analytic framework). Some commentators suggest that
the Desert Palace test has supplanted the McDonnell Douglas test and that it has cre
ated a unitary mixed motive framework for all disparate treatment cases. See, e.g.,
Michael Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither Mc
Donnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY LJ. 1887 (2004).
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on changing the workplace situations and contexts that facilitate and en
courage people to act upon their unconscious racial biases. 45 A focus on
workplace situations necessarily requires an examination of the institu
tional practices that structure workplace situations that produce racially
biased decision-making and interactions. In other words, from a social
psychology perspective, to deal with unconscious racism requires directly
confronting and challenging the institutional structures of the workplace,
and challenging how legal doctrine itself may be reinforcing racially bi
ased institutional practices.
Second, it is also necessary for critical scholars to heed the call of
Professor Perry and interrogate the cultural narratives that reinforce and
perpetuate racially biased workplace situations. The unconscious biases
that are triggered by normatively ambiguous workplace situations do not
come from thin air, nor are they the product of internal cognitive
processes of various individuals. Rather, unconscious biases and stereo
types are transmitted through ubiquitous cultural practices, and it would
be enlightening and informative to be able to link the workings of uncon
scious bias in the workplace to the transmission of values, stereotypes and
biases through cultural texts.
The critical engagement with method is a crucial endeavor for critical
scholars. In a postmodern world where all that is solid seems to instantly
melt into air, it is even more vitally important that we continually think
and rethink our methods of critical analysis in order to ensure that our
work effectively establishes "the connections between the micro level of
personal narratives, the institutional structures and historical
circumstances. "4 6
45. See generally Green, supra note 36 (arguing for disparate treatment theory
that takes into account workplace situations that create racially discriminatory em
ployment decisions).
46. Romero, supra note 2, at 938 (summarizing how sociological imagination
can assist LatCrit).
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